Abstract
INTRODUCTION
There exists a range of strategies in the policing toolbox and the evaluation of their effectiveness continues to be of primary interest to police, scholars and policy makers. As discussed in more detail below, different police practices can vary along a number of dimensions that differentiate, for example, what is done and by whom. Like anything else, the types of strategies that are employed by the police and those that are evaluated varies over time as approaches fall into and out of favor. For example, in the 1970s, attention was given to studying the effects of random patrols, while more recently, research conducted in the United States (U.S.) and elsewhere has focused on the effectiveness of geographically focused patrol strategies at high crime places -hotspots policing (e.g. Ratcliffe et al., 2011; Braga et al., 2012) .
In this article we focus on a policing strategy that, as far as we are aware, has not been implemented in the U.S. but has been employed in New South Wales (NSW), Australia over the past 20 years -Field Court Attendance Notices (FCANs). FCANs provide an alternative to arresting an alleged offender and taking them to the police station for processing. They are issued at a police officer's discretion and are generally used for relatively minor offences such as shoplifting and petty theft. FCANs are issued 'on the spot' and provide the accused with details of the alleged offense, a date and time they are required to appear at court, and the consequences of failing to attend. In other words, distinct from other policing strategies that specifically target minor offenses (e.g. removal of graffiti, aggressive use of ticketing for ordinance violations and expanded use of arrest authority), FCANs involve the use of a summons for an alleged misdemeanor (e.g. petty theft or possession of narcotics) which implies the presence of probable cause that under certain circumstances would culminate in an arrest, but instead results in a summons to court. Relative to other strategies, FCANs have two aims. The first is to allow the police to quickly and efficiently process alleged offenders, thus freeing up police time and resources. The second concerns the use of police powers of arrest. From the perspective of the courts, arrest for the majority of people is equivalent to an additional penalty and should only be used as a last resort, particularly for minor offenses.
Moreover, when applied inappropriately, the use of police powers of arrest can impact negatively upon public perceptions of police legitimacy (Feerick, 2004) . The use of FCANswhich do not involve an arrest -is intended to alleviate these two concerns.
Although the use of FCANs may be efficient with respect to the processing of offenders, it is of course important to know whether the process is effective in reducing both short-and long-term offending, and for which types of offenses FCANs are most suited. This study addresses these important policing questions for property crimes. Property crime was selected because this type of crime accounts for a large proportion of those offenses for which FCANs are applied and because many of the other offense categories (e.g. disorderly conduct, drug offenses) to which FCANs could be applied are rarely reported to police; rather they are usually discovered by them. From an evaluation perspective, the problem with these latter offenses is that changes in the rate at which they are recorded may more accurately reflect changes in police activity than changes in the absolute level at which offenses occur.
For the purposes of illustration, Appendix A shows the frequency with which FCANs have been applied for different types of offenses in NSW since the inception of their use.
This study is unique in that it provides empirical evidence regarding the impact of a policing process intended to facilitate the more efficient processing of offenders that, despite being implemented for over twenty years in Australia, has yet to be evaluated. Its evaluation is important as the strategy represents an additional option in the policing toolkit, and if found effective might be worth testing in other countries, including the U.S. The paper proceeds as follows. A brief discussion is provided of different types of police strategies, which is followed by a discussion of the theories that underpin the use of FCANs. The data used and the method employed are then discussed. Finally, the results and their implications for policing and policy are discussed.
POLICING STRATEGIES
The policing literature identifies a number of alternative policing strategies. These include the standard model of policing (for a discussion, see Weisburd & Eck, 2004) , community policing (e.g. Skogan & Hartnett, 1997) , broken windows policing (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) , hot spots policing (Sherman & Weisburd, 1995) and problem-orientated policing (Goldstein, 1990 ).
The standard model employs strategies that involve enforcing the law primarily in a reactive way. Strategies include increased number of police officers on the beat, the use of random motorized patrols to create a perception of police presence in public spaces, rapid response to calls for service intended to increase the likelihood of catching the offender, follow up investigations by detectives to enhance the chance of solving crimes, and arrest policies designed to deter and punish offenders as well as deter the general public from committing crimes. There is surprisingly limited research on the effectiveness of these strategies; however, the available evidence suggests that they tend to have limited effects on crime rates Sherman et al., 1997; Weisburd & Eck, 2004) .
Broken windows policing (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) represents a variant of the standard model. It is based on the theory that in communities where disorderly conduct and minor offenses (for example, public urination, fare skipping, shoplifting) go unchallenged, this sends a signal to offenders that crime is tolerated, which leads to a spiral of decline, which includes an increase in the severity of the offenses committed. Broken windows policing, which typically involves the strict and rapid arrest of those involved in minor offenses and disorder, is intended to reverse this process, sending a signal that crime will not be tolerated, no matter how small. Despite its perceived success, results examining the effectiveness of this approach are mixed and a recent systematic review of the effects of disorder policing (Braga et al., 2015) found no overall effect of aggressive (broken windows) policing strategies on crime and disorder. Interestingly, the same review did find that alternative forms of disorder policing -namely community and problem oriented policing strategies -reduced crime.
These latter approaches differ from the standard model and broken windows policing in a number of important ways. The first approach explicitly involves the community in policing, while problem solving (Goldstein, 1990 ) involves efforts to identify and address recurring problems and working with those (actors or agencies) with the competency to address them (whoever they might be). In their review of policing interventions and their impact on crime, Weisburd and Eck (2004) provide a useful typology for conceptualising different strategies. Their typology uses two dimensions to differentiate between the level of focus of the strategy, and the diversity of the practices employed. Strategies that are applied uniformly across a city or offenders score low in terms of their level of focus, while those that are more focused, such as (geographically focused) hotspots policing score highly. Strategies that rely on police responses alone score low on the diversity dimension. In contrast, those that engage the community in a model of co-production, or engage in problem solving with a range of agencies to address environmental (or other) conditions that make crime more likely, would score high on the diversity dimension.
The standard and broken windows models of policing require little interaction with other agencies and are not geographically focused. As such, they are located in one corner of Weisburd and Eck's (2004) policing typology. The FCANs model also occupies this quadrant, but importantly differs from these two approaches. Before articulating why more explicitly, a brief discussion of economic theory is apposite since this underpins these approaches. Becker's (1968) rational choice theory of crime postulates that individuals engage in criminal behavior because the expected benefits exceed the expected costs. According to Becker, the optimal amount of enforcement is dependent on, among other things, the cost of catching and convicting offenders, the nature of punishment (e.g. fines or prison terms), and the response of offenders to changes in enforcement. Becker demonstrated that: (1) optimal policies to combat illegal behavior are part of an optimal allocation of resources; (2) some punishments incorporate non-monetary costs to society and to offenders; and (3) crime, and the control of crime, are choices that can be modelled using the standard labor economics model of individual decision-making regarding the allocation of time. In short, crime is simply another choice, akin to making a decision to work or invest in education.
Similar to Becker, Stigler (1970) states that: "…the commission of offences will be an act of production for income [such as theft and smuggling] or an act of consumption [for example speeding in a car for recreation or fun]" (p.529). Further, "…he [the offender] will recon the present value of the expected returns and costs of the criminal activity and compare their difference with the net returns from other criminal activities and from legitimate activities" (p.530). In short, according to both Becker and Stigler, the rational offender considers the benefit of the illegal act alongside the risk of apprehension, conviction and the severity of punishment. As such, offender decision making should be amenable to manipulation through changes (perceived or actual) in these latter factors.
As modelled by Ehrlich (1973) , the expected utility from criminal activity is a function of: the probability of arrest ( ); the probability of conviction given arrest ( | ); the probability of imprisonment given conviction ( | ); and the average prison term ( ) if imprisoned (the severity of punishment). In his review of the deterrence literature, Nagin (2013) concludes (like many others) that it is the certainty, rather than the severity of punishment that has the largest deterrent effect on offending. Because > | > | , policies that target the probability of arrest and conviction are seen to be more effective in deterring criminal activity than policies focusing on the probability of imprisonment. As Nagin (2013) puts it "the conclusion that certainty not severity is the more effective deterrent is more precisely stated as certainty of apprehension and not the severity of the legal consequence ensuing from apprehension is the more effective deterrent" (p. 202).
Considering the role of the police, Nagin (2013) suggests they fulfil at least two roles. The first is acting as sentinels whose presence is intended to deter crime. The second is acting as apprehension agents whose role is to catch offenders when deterrence fails (see Nagin, 2013 ).
The use of FCANs is intended to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement in two ways. First, like broken windows policing, swift action on the part of the police is intended to increase offender perception of the certainty with which unlawful activity will be detected have potential consequences (essentially ). However, unlike broken windows policing, by not involving a formal arrest, police encounters with alleged offenders are (also) swift and do not in and of themselves result in a legal penalty without due process. As a consequence, relative to the use of on the spot arrests (which themselves represent a penalty), the approach has the potential to improve public perception of police legitimacy and procedural justice (e.g. Tyler, 2014) . This is an important goal in its own right, but research also suggests that those (citizens, victims and offenders) who perceive they have been treated fairly by the police are more likely to cooperate with them and comply with the law in the longer-term (for a review, see . In this sense, the use of FCANs has the potential to improve public perception of police encounters than do other more aggressive types of disorder policing. Second, the use of FCANs reduces the opportunity cost associated with the apprehension of offenders. This simultaneously increases the time the police have available to fulfill their role as sentinels, and where deterrence fails, the number of offenders they can proceed against, which has the potential to meaningfully influence offender perception of the risk of apprehension.
The aim of the current study is to test the impact of FCANs on crime. Specifically, we employ a quasi-experimental panel data design (drawing on a dataset of crime records collected in naturalistic settings) to uncover whether FCANs have a positive or negative effect on the rate of crime in the short-and long-term. 
DATA AND METHOD
Where the dependent variable (ln (crime k,t )) is the natural log of the crime rate for a particular category of crime in LGA k, in year t. is a general constant. The explanatory variables are: ln (crime k,t−m ) -the mth lag of the natural log of the crime rate, which is used to capture the dynamic nature of the process, in particular, how the effect of FCANs (compared to other forms of proceeding against persons of interest) is distributed over time;
ln (proceed_FCAN k,t ) -the natural log of the rate of incidents proceeded against by way of an FCAN; ln (narcotics k,t ) -the natural log of the arrest rate for possession and/or use of narcotics; and ln (unemployment k,t ) -the natural log of the unemployment rate in the LGA.
Finally, κ k denotes LGA specific fixed effects, 1 which are used to abstract from the effects of time-stable unmeasured factors that vary across LGAs (or in econometric language, timeinvariant unobservable factors), d t is the coefficient for the dummy variables 1 through to t; τ t denotes time (year) fixed effects and ε k,t is the error term. Natural logs of all variables are used to address skewness. Conveniently, this transformation allows the coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities -that is, how responsive the crime rate is (estimated to be) to changes in the volume of FCANs per person of interest proceeded against.
Distinct from Kelaher and Sarafidis (2011) and Wan et al. (2012) , in Equation 1 we do not partial out the specific probabilities of imprisonment and the average non-parole period. Hence, the coefficients of the FCAN variable should be interpreted in terms of the cumulative deterrent effects of proceeding against a person of interest by way of an FCAN, including the attendant effect of the probability of apprehension, conviction (these two are arguably synonymous, with 92% of those charged with a criminal offence being convicted (Wan et al., 2012) , imprisonment and sentence served.
In addition to LGA fixed effects, time fixed effects are also included in the model.
The latter capture potential cross-sectional dependence (shocks common to all individuals at a point in time). The inclusion of time fixed effects is particularly important as the autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the coefficient standard errors, on which the dynamic panel data model crucially relies, assume no correlation across LGAs in the idiosyncratic disturbances. Time fixed effects make this assumption more likely to hold (Roodman, 2009 ).
THE ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
The estimation technique employed for the dynamic panel data model specified in 
Where all variables are defined as in Equation 1. Note, however, that the constant term (ω) is transformed out in first differenced-GMM. The implementation of this estimator is the ideal vehicle for testing causal claims about the criminal justice system on the property crime rate as it is possible to distinguish the temporal order of events. This technique ameliorates the problems that result from having endogenous explanatory variables. As noted by Wan et al. (2012) this estimator mitigates the risk of omitted variables, simultaneity, 2 ratio bias and it avoids full specification of the serial correlation and heteroscedasticity properties of the error.
It is also worth noting that while the twostep GMM estimator is more efficient than the onestep 2SLS estimator, the first-differenced GMM is more conservative than the system GMM. 3 However, the standard errors are severely downwardly biased in finite samples. To remedy this, robust Windmeijer-corrected standard errors are reported (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Roodman, 2009; Windmeijer, 2005) . Moreover, orthogonal deviations (Arellano & Bover, 1995) and the small sample size correction (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2011) are employed. A number of diagnostic checks and procedures are also used to ensure the appropriateness of the models estimated.
DIAGNOSTIC CHECKS
To begin, in Equation 2, all explanatory variables (except for the time fixed effects) are treated as endogenous or predetermined. Importantly, the Arellano-Bond estimator used in this study employs 'internal' instruments for the endogenous variables. These instruments are lags of the independent variables. 4 For example, the ln(crime kt−1 ) variable in column 1 of Between the first differenced contemporaneous error term (∆ε k,t ) and the first differenced error in t-1 (∆ε k,t−1 ) (as indicated by AR(1)); -Between first differenced contemporaneous error term (∆ε k,t ) and the first differenced error in t-2 (∆ε k,t−2 ) (as indicated by AR(2)); and -Between the first differenced contemporaneous error term (∆ε k,t ) and the first differenced error in t-3 (∆ε k,t−3 ) (as indicated by AR(3)).
AR(1) Prob > z = 0.0000
Note, we expect to reject the null hypothesis at the first order AR (1) as:
But we do not expect it to be rejected at higher orders (∆ε k,t will not be correlated with ∆ε k,t−s for ≥ 2). The results in column 1 of Table 3a indicate that there is no serial correlation in the original error ∆ε k,t , as desired. In the estimated models, the number of autoregressive terms or lags was determined by statistical significance, the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for zero autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors and satisfaction of the exclusion restriction.
A potential pitfall associated with the use of the Arellano-Bond estimator is the problem of instrument proliferation. That is, the Arellano-Bond estimator may generate many internal instruments. For example, where the ln(proceed_FCAN k,t ) variable is instrumented using its own lags (specifically, the (ln ( _ , −1 ) (1 st order lag),
(ln ( _ , −2 ) (2 nd order lag) and (ln ( _ , −3 ) (3 rd order lag). In t = 3 only the first two of these are available. In t = 4, 5 and 6 all three are available yielding a total of 2 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 11 instruments over t = 4 to t = 6 alone and for the FCAN variable alone. Each instrumenting variable generates one column for each time period and lag available to that time period making the number of instruments quadratic in T. In order to address this proliferation of instruments, the instruments may be 'collapsed'. This stacks these instruments in long form. For example,
or, collapsed
In doing so, we are able to guard against instrument proliferation that would otherwise weaken the Hansen test (for example, you could get implausibly good p values of 1.0000), which, while robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, is not robust to instrument proliferation. The use of too many instruments would fail to expunge the endogeneity through overfitting. For intuition, consider that 2SLS, if the number of instruments equals the number of observations, the R 2 of the first-stage regressions are 1 and the second-stage results match those of (biased) OLS. The use of the collapse option helps to address this problem (Roodman, 2009 ). For example, in column 1 of Table 3a (discussed in full later) without collapsing the instruments 221 are generated. In contrast when the instruments are collapsed the instrument count is only 29.
Additional measures were taken to interrogate the appropriateness of the model. 
SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN IMPACTS OF FCANS
Results for rates of crime are presented with respect to their short-and long-run effects.
The short-run effect refers to changes that occur in a given period (in this study, each year).
The long-run effect, also known as the total or asymptotic effect, encompasses the entire distributive process; it includes (in addition to the short-run effect) the impact of the variables in previous periods through the lag term(s).
A priori, it is expected that the lag terms, individually, will be less than unity although greater than zero and sum to less than one to ensure stationarity. After holding other factors constant, the short-run effects (the coefficients) γ 1 may be expected to be positive if greater use of FCANs encourages offending (or conversely other means of proceeding against discourages offending). It is possible that being issued a FCAN, rather than being proceeded against by other means, may provide less of a deterrent. This is quite plausible for more violent offenses. For example, Kelaher and Sarafidis (2011) find that violent offenders are more persistent and resistant to deterrence. It may also be the case, however, that for relatively minor offences or economically motivated crimes, the use of FCANs enables law enforcement officers to increase capture rates, thus creating a larger deterrent effect, ceteris paribus. This would translate to a negative coefficient for γ 1 . With regards to the other determinants of the crime rate, the coefficients γ 2 and γ 3 are expected to be positive.
The short-term effects illustrated by the coefficient estimates γ 1 through to γ 3 only point to a fraction of the asymptotic effect that is distributed over time.
In order to estimate the total long-run effect on the crime rate, Equation 3 is employed:
Where the sum of the lag term(s) (α m ) is less than one and greater than zero within the bounds of stationarity. The magnitude of this coefficient determines the degree to which the effect of FCANs is distributed over the short-compared to the long-run. The long-run cumulative effect can be expected to be greater than the short-run effect.
RESULTS
A simple examination of the pairwise contemporaneous correlations are illustrated in Table 2 . Results show that in some cases the correlation between variables is relatively high.
The highest correlations are 0.5724 (for motor vehicle theft, between ln(narcotics) and ln(crime)), 0.3982 (for steal from person, between ln(narcotics) and ln(crime)) and 0.3978 (for stealing, between ln(narcotics) and ln(crime)). They are all at the upper bounds of an acceptable level, nonetheless we feel that correlations between variables have not adversely affected results and we are, therefore, confident in the estimates presented in the following sections.
5
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 5 Variance inflation factors were also investigated. This is a significant hurdle for models which include lag(s) of the dependent variable. All models except the 'Motor vehicle theft' model have variance inflation factors that are less than the rule of thumb of 10. For this model the highest variance inflation factor is found for the second order lag of 'Motor vehicle theft', which is marginally higher than 10 at 11.1900 11. . O'Brien (2007 shows that even variance inflation factors well over 10 are not necessarily a serious problem. Multicollinearity does not bias coefficient or standard error estimates, it simply increases standard errors relative to instances with low collinearity. Larger standard errors, of course, make it harder to reject the null hypothesis and can explain null findings. Nonetheless, it does not appear that our models are especially affected by multicollinearity. The magnitude, signs and levels of statistical significance for the short-term effect do not change greatly for the omission of this lag term. This likely reflects the fact that the variance inflation factor only marginally exceeds the conventional limit.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In Tables 3 (a and b ) and 4 (a and b) we report the short-run and long-run results for rates of property crime. 6 We reiterate that the impact of the FCAN variable is interpreted as the impact of the use of FCANs to proceed against persons of interest as either reducing or increasing the crime rates through deterrence (or lack thereof), compared to other means of proceeding.
INSERT TABLE 3a and 3b HERE Tables 3a and 3b provide an abridged summary of short-run model results for rates of overall property crime and the 11 sub-categories of offending considered. Full results are presented as Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B. As indicated in Table 3a (column 1), we did not find a statistically significant association between the use of FCANs and overall property offences at the 5% level (p-value of 0.0760). In terms of the distributed process itself, it is best described by a first order, second order and fourth order lag. These coefficient estimates are stationary and are not statistically significantly different from equivalent pooled ordinary least squares estimates (which are biased upwards) and greater than similar fixed effects 6 The reader should note that crime categories 9 (Steal from person) and 10 (Stock theft) contain a number of zeros, which before being logged are linearly transformed by adding a constant of 1 (a typical approach employed to deal with zero values in this context). Results for these categories therefore have the potential to be biased with the strength of the relationship between the use of FCANs and crime rates in these categories being understated. All other categories do not have this problem. One way of addressing this is to take the square root of the variable. However, this requires the reader to use the chain rule to interpret the results -this is complex and not widely understood, making interpretation of the results more difficult. The use of natural log allows a more straightforward interpretation of the results and permits the estimation of a flexible functional form. For completeness, we analyzed the data using a square root transformation (results available upon request) but as the results did not differ materially (but are harder to interpret) to those reported we discuss them no further.
OFFENCE RATES IN THE SHORT-RUN
estimates (which are biased downwards). The lag terms of all subsequent regression estimates fall neatly within the bounds suggested by these models.
In regards to sub-categories 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, the results indicate that a 1% increase in the use of FCANs reduces offenses by between 0.05% (sub-category 7) and 14.72% (subcategory 6). No statistically significant relationship could be found between the use of FCANs and offense rates for offense sub-categories 3, 4, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The coefficient estimates are stationary, and the lag term coefficient estimates fall within the bounds of equivalent pooled ordinary least squares estimates and fixed effects estimates.
In regards to the effect of the arrest rate for the possession and use of narcotics, a strong positive association is found between this variable and stealing sub-categories 4, 7 and 11. In regards to the rate of unemployment, a positive association is found between this variable and stealing sub-categories 5 and 7.
Our F-test results suggest that all models are jointly statistically significant at the 1% level and the Arellano and Bond test provides no evidence of autocorrelation at AR(2) and AR(3). Further, the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions is not rejected in any model.
Not rejecting the Hansen test of overriding restrictions is important. It means that the instruments themselves are not endogenous (they are exogenous). That is, they do not explain
the dependent variable except through the independent variables that they are instrumenting. Tables 4a and 4b provide long-run model results. Tables 4a and 4b , the use of FCANs has a statistically significant negative longrun effect on the rates of offenses for sub-categories 5, 7 and 8. No significant relationship is found for the other sub-categories.
THE LONG-RUN IMPACT OF FCANS ON OFFENSE RATES

INSERT TABLE 4a and 4b HERE
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to estimate the impact of FCANs on overall rates of property offenses and for 11 specific types of offenses. In both the short-and long-run, at the 5% level we find no statistically significant effect between the use of FCANs and the overall level of property offenses. Considering the sub-categories of offenses, in the short-run, with the exception of the offense receiving stolen goods, the directions of the estimated coefficients are consistent with the idea that FCANs have a deterrent effect on specific types of crime.
These effects are statistically significant for five of the 11 sub-categories of offenses (break and enter dwelling; motor vehicle theft; steal from motor vehicle; steal from retail store and;
steal from dwelling). Setting statistical significance aside for one moment, one reason for the anomalous finding for the offense receiving stolen goods is perhaps that, unlike the other offenses, this is not a direct contact crime, and offenders may perceive the likelihood of detection as lower for this than for other types of offenses.
The long-run results are largely consistent with the short-run results. That is, in the long-run, our results show that an increase in the use of FCANs leads to statistically significant decreases in the rate of crime for the following sub-categories of offenses: motor vehicle theft; steal from retail store; and steal from dwelling.
The empirical analysis presented above thus suggests that for some categories of offenses, the use of FCANs may be an effective and potentially efficient policing strategy in that, compared to alternative approaches of proceeding, offenders can be processed at lower cost and long-run rates of crime reduced. However, it would appear that the effects are specific rather than generalized, since the effects were observed only for some forms of crime, both in the short-and long-term, and overall property crime did not appear to be affected. Thus, contrary to the ideas that underpin Broken Windows policing, the use of FCANs did not appear to have a general deterrent effect on property crime. If replicated elsewhere, this finding suggests that rather than being applied universally across crime types, the use of FCANs should be targeted to address specific types of crime. While it was not possible to do this in the current study, unpicking why FCANs appear to impact upon some forms of (minor) crime but not others would seem to be a useful next step.
Continuing with the theme of specificity, as noted in the introduction, in NSW FCANs are applied uniformly across geographic locations. The absence of a geographic focus to this strategy contrasts with contemporary initiatives in the U.S. and other countries where hotspots policing is currently enjoying popularity (e.g. Braga et al., 2015) . The aim of hotspots policing is to direct resources to those locations where the likelihood of crime is highest. As such, the targeting strategy is intended to increase the frequency with which police officers will be present during the commission of a crime (or better still) before it occurs, increasing the likelihood that they will detect or (more likely) deter it. In this way, the targeting strategy can be seen to increase the dosage of police officer presence at locations where crime is most likely. The use of FCANs also effectively influences dosage. That is, through their swift administration (relative to arrests) FCANs increase the amount of time that police officers are available to act as sentinels or guardians against crime. An obvious evolution that might be tested in future research would be to combine the use of FCANs and a hotspots policing strategy.
A further issue discussed in the introduction concerned procedural justice and police legitimacy. We noted that, relative to more aggressive disorder policing strategies, the process through which FCANs are issued may well increase public -and indeed offender (see ) -perceptions of police legitimacy, and as a consequence influence their compliance with the law. It was beyond the scope of the current study to examine this issue here, but future research might examine (for example) public perceptions of police legitimacy for encounters that involve the issuance of FCANs as opposed to those that involve the arrest of offenders (for similar offenses).
This study is of course not without limitations. Chief amongst these is that the data analyzed are recorded crime data that are reported to and recorded by the police. It is well documented that much crime goes unreported and so the reader should consider this when interpreting the results reported here. However, we can see no obvious reason for why this should affect the results reported, as the model specification was designed to address such
issues.
An additional caveat to consider when interpreting these results is that at an individual level, it is plausible that there is some self-selection in terms of police officers' decisions regarding the use of FCANs versus other means of proceeding against persons of interest. For example, it is possible that police officers are more likely to issue FCANs to individuals who are less likely to re-offend or conversely less likely to issue FCANs to individuals who are more likely to re-offend. This decision is a result of their understanding of individuals of interest who reside or operate within their local area command. Such self-selection would exaggerate the deterrent effect. This is difficult to test using a quasi-experimental design, but future studies might do so using a randomized control trial intended to detect direct effects of the intervention and any diffusion of benefits that might arise.
This study is unique in that it provides empirical evidence regarding the use of a policing process intended to more efficiently process offenders for relatively minor crimes (specifically, property offenses). For approximately 20 years FCANs have been used by NSW police, however, the effectiveness of this has not previously been investigated. The findings reported here thus have important implications for police management who are held to account both in regards to the strategies employed to protect or enhance community safety but also the effectiveness of these strategies in terms of reductions in the overall rate of crime. Our findings suggest that for some crimes the effects of the approach are observable in the short-term but are also persistent. The approach thus represents a promising one that might be added to the police toolbox in countries other than Australia.
Future research may benefit from investigating the potentially time varying heterogeneity of the autoregressive terms. It may be the case that the distributed impacts of the use of FCANs differ over time, and may potentially reveal some interesting and useful insights in terms of the dynamic nature of the process. In our study we controlled for and abstracted from spatial/geographic/locational heterogeneity, specifically, differences between local government areas. By treating spatial/geographic/locational heterogeneity as a nuisance term, this study provides estimates independent of such contextual factors. However, this research might be extended further by exploring how the effectiveness of policing policies may depend on different spatial/geographic/locational characteristics. For instance, it may be the case that FCANs are more or less effective in areas of high/low informal surveillance.
Further work may also explore the extent to which the apparent effects of the use of FCANs are due to the police being able to process offenders more quickly (i.e. their role as apprehension agents), or to their opportunity to act as sentinels whose presence deters crime. 
